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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine, and whether 
the endeavor was successful.  In order for Russian hybrid warfare to have been 
successful, the costs and repercussions of their actions must not outweigh their achieved 
goals.  For this thesis, it was assumed that Russia’s goals are: locking NATO and the EU 
out of Russia’s remaining sphere of influence, demonstrating Russian solidarity, gaining 
territory, and boosting popularity for the current administration.  Russia was able to 
achieve all of these goals with the annexation of Crimea and use of military force in the 
Donbass region.  The costs of these actions included high military spending, 
infrastructure costs and financial losses, and international backlash. This can be separated 
into the economic and political sector.  Economically, Russia faces massive costs, which 
are sure to increase in the coming years, in an already weakened economy.  Politically, 
Russia has been shunned by the West and now seeks closer ties with its eastern 
neighbors.  While these costs are high, EU and NATO presence has not spread further 
West, Russia has shown its ability to act in the region, and Putin’s popularity in Russia 
remains extremely high.  With these factors in mind, it can be deemed that Russia’s 
hybrid war in Ukraine was successful, although marginally so.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2014, Ukraine fell under attack from several different sources, including 
attacks on their economic security and unknown military personnel leading riots and 
taking control of buildings. These events were later attributed to Russia and called a 
hybrid war. To what extent has Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine been successful?  For 
any actor to be successful, they must meet their goals while sustaining reasonable or 
expected losses.  According to the Kremlin, Russia’s only reason for intervening in 
Ukraine is to protect ethnic Russians. However, this thesis argues that some other 
motives may be inferred based on previous Russian actions. The events leading up to the 
hybrid war shed some light on what these motives may be.  A major event that started the 
conflict in Ukraine, was the Euromaidan, a massive protest of the Ukrainian people.  The 
Ukrainian people were looking to begin a partnership with the EU. The then Ukrainian 
president instead decided to reaffirm a partnership with Russia, leading to protests that 
would eventually turn violent. The EU and NATO both require a country to be in full 
control of its territory in order to gain member status.  Further, neither organization wants 
to earn the ire of Russia by admitting a member that is currently in a conflict with 
Moscow.  Thus, Russia was attempting to keep Western influence from its borders.  The 
conflict has also been construed as a show of strength by the current Russian 
administration.  Putin is able to show his government’s control over the region, and how 
much he cares for Russians everywhere, earning him popularity with his citizens.  By 
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contrasting these goals with the costs and repercussions that have followed Russia’s 
hybrid war, I determine that Russia’s hybrid war was relatively successful.   
The definition of hybrid warfare differs slightly from scholar to scholar, but the 
most generally accepted definition is that put forth by the NATO Capstone Concept, 
which states that “hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to 
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit 
of their objectives.” 1 The European Union defines a hybrid war as a situation where a 
country uses armed forces and a mix of other factors, such as economic or political.2 
Frank Hoffman, a security specialist, defines hybrid warfare as incorporating a range of 
different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.3 While it is the most widely accepted, NATO’s definition is very broad and 
leaves many questions with its definition.  Conversely, Hoffman’s definition cuts out 
much of the scope of what hybrid warfare can be. All definitions seem to agree that 
hybrid warfare combines conventional and non-conventional means.  Conventional 
military is understandable enough, but non-conventional is left open ended without 
clarification.  Non-conventional is the use of anything other than military force against 
another entity to achieve an objective.  This would include cyber-attacks, impeding 
                                                          
1  Michael Aaronson et al. "NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat." (Prism 2, no. 4 (2012)) 111-24. 
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-4/Prism_111-124_Aaronson-Diessen.pdf. 
2  Members’ Research Services, “At a Glance”, (European Parliament, 2015), accessed 3/20/17 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/564355/EPRS_ATA(2015)564355_EN.pdf  
3 Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Publication. Center for Emerging 
Threats and Opportunities, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 14. 
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industry, or covert operations, for example.  A notable attribute of these means is that the 
effects are in plain view of the public, but allow the one responsible to wave off 
accusations.  Putting these definitions together, hybrid warfare is war fought using 
multiple dimensions (e.g. the cyber, criminal, political, or economic) in concert with the 
military against an actor, state or non-state, in order to achieve a goal.  
There are some who do not believe hybrid warfare to be a reality, such as Michael 
Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, who question whether or not hybrid warfare or threats 
are terms we even need in our vocabulary when discussing the issue.  According to them, 
these threats have all been seen individually, and to term them as something new is to 
mislead the public4.  Aaronson, et al. disagrees, and states that, while we may have seen 
all these threats before, we have never seen them used together as effectively as we do 
today.  Using the article “Mif о ‘gibridnoi voine’" (Myth of ‘hybrid war’) as a Russian 
perspective, it can be assumed that Russians would err on the side of Kofman and 
Rojansky. This article, by Ruslan Puhov, is in opposition to much of the Western 
literature, such as Hoffman’s Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars and, 
as the title suggest, calls hybrid war a myth and states that the actions dictated as being 
hybrid war are now standard in most military engagements5. Kofman and Rojansky do 
not disregard hybrid warfare to the extent seen in the article by Puhov. Instead, they 
claim that what is now being called hybrid warfare in regards to Russia is a series of 
                                                          
4  Michael Kofman, and Matthew Rojansky."A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War’." Kennan Cable, 
April 2015. Accessed September 18, 2016 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/190090/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/81eee96d-
e368-4b10-8f2e-4d801467a538/en/5-KENNAN CABLE-ROJANSKY KOFMAN.pdf 
5  Ruslan Puhov.  “Mif о "gibridnoi voine"" / Realii / Nezavisimaja gazeta. September 5, 2015. Accessed 
September 18, 2016 http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-05-29/1_war.html 
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events that would be hard to replicate in any other conflict due to the circumstances and 
capabilities of Russia in the region.  By naming them hybrid warfare and acting to protect 
itself, NATO and other international organizations have put fear into something that has 
not developed enough to warrant a reaction in any way.   
Determining the successes and costs of hybrid warfare is important, as it gives 
some insight into where and when one might expect a hybrid threat to appear.  Hybrid 
conflicts may vary from actor to actor, but the situations they are used in are largely 
similar, namely when one agent or state intends to engage in a conflict with another that 
is objectively stronger militarily or to avoid other consequences.  Russia used this tactic 
in order to avoid some consequences from the international community.  By determining 
whether Russia’s hybrid war specifically is successful, it may be possible to determine 
whether Russia will use it again.  Determining the costs plays a similar role.  Comparing 
the perceived benefits of a hybrid operation and the associated costs could help to predict 
whether it is in Russia’s, or possibly another actor’s, interests to continue with the 
strategy of hybrid warfare. Some scholarship on the topic of the Ukraine Crisis, such as 
Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West by Andrew Wilson6, shed light on the 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine and how this relationship led to conflict and 
turmoil in the Donbass region.  Richard Sakwa’s Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the 
Borderlands does much the same, with more of a focus on Ukraine than Russia and the 
West.7  Neither of these works touches on the effect of hybrid warfare in the conflict 
itself.  Wilson makes some note of hybrid warfare, but he does not linger on the subject.  
                                                          
6 Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis What It Means to the West, New Haven: Yale 2014 
7 Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine Crisis in the Borderlands, I.B. Tauris & Co. 2015 
5 
 
He briefly discusses why a hybrid war was favorable for Russia and some tools they 
utilized, but little else.8  
Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine began in late February of 2014, following the 
events of Euromaidan.  Armed men of an obviously military nature appeared on the 
Crimean Peninsula.  These men did not identify themselves as part of any nation’s army, 
nor did they wear any identifying insignia’s.  These men quickly took control of capital 
buildings in Simferapol and Sevastopol.9  This quickly led to the referendum for Crimea 
to join Russia, which many countries have refused to accept.  Later in 2014, similar 
troops were found in the Donbass regions of Ukraine, taking control of important 
buildings and equipment, as well as leading separatist groups in the regions.10  This series 
of events falls under all definitions of hybrid warfare, as Russia did not need to use overt 
force to achieve its goals, and did not rely solely on any one irregular tactic.  Instead, 
Russia used several pre-existing conditions in order to create chaos in Ukraine.  The only 
forces present were officially unidentifiable and, in the Donbass region, were leading 
bands of Ukrainian rebels against their government.  Media channels were not only 
seized, but were replaced.  Russia used its control of hydrocarbon markets to further 
destabilize Ukraine.  All these came together to create a conflict without an invasion ever 
being declared or any kind of identifiable war having begun.   
 
 
                                                          
8 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 192 
9 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 110-111 
10 Wilson, Ukraine Crisis, pg. 126 
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CHAPTER 1: CREATING THE HYBRID WAR IN UKRAINE 
 
    In order to determine the degree of success Russia has had in their use of hybrid war in 
Ukraine, we must first examine the variables that led to crises in Crimea and the 
Donbass.  Moscow has taken similar actions (disinformation campaigns, invasions, 
shows of force) in the past against former Soviet Republics who wish to, or are, partnered 
with the West. Georgia in 2008 and the Baltics in 2013 serve as examples of this. 
However, neither of these instances had the same degree of preparation and varied tactics 
or had quite the same effect on the intended victim as the tactics used against Ukraine.  In 
2013, Russia put large military forces along the borders it shares with the Baltics for 
military training purposes.  Many in the Baltics felt that this was a show of force against 
their joining NATO in 2004.  In 2008, Russia began a war with Georgia over the status of 
the separatist region of South Ossetia.11 In nations that have not attempted to turn West, 
Russia has used its existing political influence in the former Soviet Union to create the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and integrate them into a trade network.  This has 
allowed Russia to have more influence over these countries and prevents future attempts 
to join the EU and other economic or political organizations.12  In Ukraine, Russia has 
                                                          
11 Ott Ummelas and Aaron Eglitis, “Russian War Games on Baltic border spark security fears”, Bloomberg, 
September 2013, accessed 1/21/2017 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-20/russian-war-
games-on-baltic-border-spark-security-fears 
Anne Applebaum, “Russia invades Georgia while the West watches”, Slate, August 2008, accessed 
1/10/2017http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2008/08/world_inaction.html 
12 Jan Strzelecki, “Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis”, OSW, February 2016, accessed 1/21/2017 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-02-01/eurasian-economic-union-a-time-
crisis 
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adopted a different strategy, utilizing its own control of energy infrastructure and 
hydrocarbons as a weapon, and its capability to influence Ukrainian citizens through 
shared language and media in an attempt to convince the Ukrainian public not to trust 
their government. Through these variables Russia was able to begin a hybrid war. 
Language has both divided and unified Ukraine since independence.  Before 
1991, Ukraine was under the control of other, more powerful nations and empires.  These 
polities often sought to impose their own language on the people of Ukraine, as seen 
during Russification under the Soviet Union.13  Many Ukrainian speakers likely see their 
language as distinguishing themselves from Russians.  So it stands to reason that those 
who speak Russian would identify more as Russians. As seen in Figure 3, those that both 
speak Russian and identify as ethnically Russian were more likely to agree with Russia’s 
decision to intervene in Ukraine.  Ethnic ties to Russia are already strong due to 
Ukraine’s obvious proximity to Russia and the history they share.  These ties are 
strongest in the oblasts of Southeast Ukraine, specifically Crimea, Dnipropetrovsk, 
Donetsk, Kharkov, Kherson, Lugansk, and Zaporozhye.  These regions are affected the 
most by Russian influence and culture, although most of these areas still have a majority 
population that identifies as Ukrainian.14  Crimea, Lugansk, and Donetsk are among those 
that have a larger than average percentage of people who identify as ethnically Russian. 
Crimea’s larger than normal percentage of ethnic Russians made it the first target of 
hybrid tactics.  Russian soldiers without insignia were able to take control and most likely 
                                                          
13  Anne Applebaum, “The Victory of Ukraine”, New York Review of Books, 2016 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/07/the-victory-of-ukraine/  
14 Nicolai Petro, “Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone Ukraine”, 
Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda, and Perspectives, 2015, accessed 2/15/2017 
http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf 
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force a referendum.  After the fact, Putin stated that this was done in an effort to protect 
Russians everywhere. 15  This show of apparent concern for the region as well as a 
gratuitous show of force further bonded the Crimean people to Russia, while western 
regions were less responsive.16   The Donbass region does not have the same ethnic ties 
to Russia, but they do have a majority population who speak Russian, again going back to 
language.  According to Serhy Yekelchyk, this adoption of the Russian language during 
the Soviet Era bonded the people of the Donbass to the USSR, and then to the Russian 
patriarchy following the USSR’s collapse.17    
Due to its history in the Soviet Union and the prominence of the Russian 
language, much of Ukraine’s media in the south and east comes from Russia.18 .  Moscow 
was able to use this influence over Russian speaking Ukrainians to promote their 
narrative of events in Ukraine.  Disinformation campaigns like this are a key component 
of hybrid warfare, and serve to keep a society off balance or polarized. Russia is able to 
do this in Ukraine through Channels like Channel One and Russia 24 are state owned.  
Moscow has been able to do this to great effect in their own country, with government 
controlled mass media directly, and powerfully, influencing public opinion to suit the 
needs of the Kremlin19.  Russian media spoke of the Ukrainian government killing its 
                                                          
15 ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, President of Russia website, 18 March 2014, accessed 
3/21/2017 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 
16  Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, Olga Shorina, Putin. War, http://4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-
Eng.pdf pg. 13-15 
17 Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press 
2015, pg. 116-117 
18 Jill Dougherty, “Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation”, Shorenstein 
Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy, July 2014, accessed 3/2/2017 
https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/d88-dougherty.pdf 
19 Dougherty, “Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation” 
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citizens in the Donbass region in a fashion similar to the holocaust, spurring more people 
to join the separatist cause and call for the regions autonomy.20    Russian media also 
defames Western governments, specifically the United States, by stating that they are 
providing weapons to the “fascist” Ukrainian government, and citing pictures of past 
American transports in Latvia and Lithuania as America’s current involvement in 
Ukraine.21  Through reports like these, Russia attempts to convince Ukrainian citizens, 
specifically those that identify as Russian, that the Ukrainian government does not have 
their best interests at heart. Russian media and propaganda perpetuated the lie of 
separatists being only Ukrainian citizens for as long as possible, but after some months it 
became evident that Russians were leading the few Ukrainians in the conflict. Polls from 
2014 show that only a small portion of Eastern Ukraine agreed with Russian intervention. 
In fact, the majority of Ukrainians in every region polled believed that it was unnecessary 
for Russia to send in troops.  Figure 3 shows that even those that identify as ethnic 
Russians are divided as to whether or not Russian intervention is beneficial.  The same 
percentage of people view the intervention as both favorable and unfavorable.22   
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Kim, “Putin waging information warfare in Ukraine” 
21  Laas Leivat, “Russian Propaganda: Twisted, fabricated, insidious Estonian Life”, Estonian World 
Review, February 2015, accessed 1/10/2017 http://www.eesti.ca/russian-propaganda-twisted-fabricated-
insidious-estonian-life/article44443 
22 Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14-26, 2014”, 
March 2014, pg. 7 accessed 1/21/2017 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of
%20Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf 
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Source:  Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine March 14-26, 2014”, March 2014, pg.7 
accessed 1/21/2017 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine,%20March%
2014-26,%202014.pdf  
 
Russia has also exerted pressure on Ukraine’s energy sector, which has hurt the 
Ukrainian economy and made them ever more dependent on Russia.  Before the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had its own effective hydrocarbon infrastructure, although it 
relied on its ties to Russia to make use of the capital in place.  However, after becoming 
Figure 3 
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independent from the Union, Ukraine’s hydrocarbon producing industry has fallen into 
disrepair due to corruption, lack of modernization, and other organizational issues. This 
has led to a strong reliance on Russian natural gas.23 Russia has used its dominance of the 
hydrocarbon market in order to severely damage the economy of Ukraine.  This 
originally began in 2003 with Russia’s decision to develop alternative pipelines to bypass 
Ukraine, and therefore bypass Ukraine’s taxes (i.e., Blue Stream and Baltic Pipeline 
Systems).24  This was followed by an increase in gas prices to Ukraine, meant to further 
destabilize the economy.  Ukraine is heavily reliant on natural gas, and any increase in 
price will damage its economy.  Ukraine was forced into an agreement with $485 per 
thousand cubic meters in April of 2014, while Germany and other European countries 
paid over a hundred dollars less per thousand cubic meters.25 This was the climax of 
Russian price escalation that began in 2005. Between the years of 2010 and 2013, 
Ukraine was paying roughly the same amount annually as Germany, a country with a 
much higher demand for resources.26 A few months after the final price agreement was 
struck, Russia ceased sending any gas at all to Ukraine.  The coal industry in Ukraine was 
subsequently destroyed, as separatists took control of or destroyed much of the necessary 
infrastructure, likely under the suggestions of Russian military officers or government 
officials.  Had it not been for the relatively warm winter, things may have been much 
                                                          
23 Jeffrey Tayler, “Russia Raises Natural Gas Threat against Ukraine”, National Geographic, March 2014, 
accessed 1/21/2017 http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/03/140303-russia-natural-gas-
threat-against-ukraine/ 
24  Mykhailo Gonchar, Andriy Chubyk, & Oksana Ishchuk, “Energy Component in New Generation 
Warfare,” (Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”: “Antare Project,” August 2015, accessed 10/16/2016 
http://geostrategy.org.ua/images/August_2015_Hybrid_Aggression_final.pdf 
25 Nataliia Slobodia, “Energy Instruments of hybrid warfare”, Stratfor, March 2016, accessed 1/19/2017 
https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/energy-instruments-%E2%80%9Chybrid-warfare%E2%80%9D 
26 Gonchar, “Energy Component in New Generation Warfare” 
14 
 
worse.  Even so, Kiev found it necessary to implement rolling blackouts and lessen the 
power consumption of some industries.   
    Russia was able to damage more than just the current Ukrainian economy through its 
control of the energy sector.  Russia has slandered Ukraine with accusations of gas theft 
and refusal to pay owed debts in 2009, followed by Russia turning off the transport of gas 
through Ukraine. This hurt not only Ukraine, but also Europe and Russia itself, as 
Ukraine held the one pipeline between the two.  Russia used accusations and its refusal to 
sell to show Europe that Ukraine was an untrustworthy partner.  Construction of pipelines 
that bypass Ukraine are also a constant threat to the country.  Russia already transports 
half as much gas through Ukraine than it did in the last decade.  Should Russia choose to 
abandon the Ukraine pipeline altogether, Ukraine would become nearly obsolete as a 
political or economic partner to both Russia and Europe.  Lack of gas and a large portion 
of the countries income could force Ukraine to give in to Russian demands, and possibly 
hand over control of its government altogether.27   
    Finally, Russia leveraged considerable political control over the government of 
Ukraine.  The events of Euromaidan in 2013-2014, which was the spark for the Ukraine 
crisis, can be somewhat attributed to Russian power over influential figures in Ukrainian 
politics.  The president at the time, Victor Yanukovych, was a Russian leaning politician 
who had been given the choice between moving towards the West and signing an EU 
association agreement, or reaffirming ties with Russia by taking a loan bailout and 
beginning the process of joining the EAEU.  Popular support was for the EU agreement, 
and Yanukovych had declared that he would sign for the EU.  However, he broke his 
                                                          
27 Tayler, “Russia raises natural gas threat against Ukraine” 
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word and suspended talks with the EU, leading to the protests that would soon turn 
deadly28.  He has since fled to Russia and possibly been given Russian citizenship under 
suspicious circumstances.  Yanukovych’s decision can most likely be attributed to 
Russian pressure and incentivizing.  The Eurasian Union has much fewer standards for 
entry when compared to the EU, as it serves less as an economic union and more as a 
stronger bond between Russia and the other members. By contrast, the EU has several 
qualifications that need to be met in full before a nation can be considered for assessment, 
eventually leading to membership.  These high standards are the reasons so many eastern 
European countries have found trouble joining the organization.  The deal offered by 
Russia would also provide much needed short term relief for the Ukrainian government 
and economy by removing some of the Russian debt that Ukraine had accrued29.  It has 
been speculated however, that the long term benefits of any agreement with the EU 
would far outweigh any of the short term promises made by Moscow.  Ukrainian industry 
would suffer for some few years as it adapted to the more favorable European industries 
competing for trade, but would eventually see large profits due to access to new 
technologies and markets it would never have.  Many Ukrainians, possibly 50% or more, 
saw the better standards of living and more democratic countries in Europe as a positive, 
as well as it effectively removing Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence.  The most 
plausible reasons for Yanukovych choosing Russia’s deal are short-sightedness and his 
                                                          
28  Serhiy Kudelia, “The House that Yanukovych Built”, Journal of Democracy, July 2014, accessed 
3/2/2017 http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine-25-3.pdf  
29 Katelyn Ferral, “On the Brink: Viktor Yanukovych’s Decisions and the Ukrainian Retreat from Europe”, 
University of North Carolina, 2014, pg. 29-31, accessed 3/2/17 
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:405c11d5-cddd-4a63-855e-4301352740e4  
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own predisposition towards, as well as pressure from, Russia overriding the wants of his 
own people30.  
 
 
  
                                                          
30 Judy Woodruff and Steven Pifer, “Why did Ukraine’s Yanukovych give in to Russian pressure on EU 
deal?”, PBS Newshour, December 2013, accessed 3/2/2017 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-
dec13-ukraine2_12-02/  
Ferral, “On the Brink” 
17 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC LOSSES SUSTAINED BY RUSSIA 
  
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had an effect on their own side of the border, 
notably in their finances. Any conflict has its share of financial costs, but many of 
Russia’s come from non-traditional expenses.  In a normal conflict, both sides would 
have considerable military expenditures.  Russia would have also faced considerably 
more backlash than economic sanctions, as the international community would have more 
evidence to base their decisions on. However, Russia’s multi-pronged strategy of hybrid 
warfare has multiple price tags attached, while simultaneously allowing them to act 
without fear of military or grave political repercussions. Not only has Russia had to pay 
for increased military, both their own and any supplies they may or may not have given 
to Ukrainian separatists, but there are also the costs associated with annexing Crimea and 
the sanctions that followed. Where a modern war would have involved increased 
spending on weaponry, Moscow has likely spent more paying families to agree not to talk 
about how family members in the military died.  Due to the nature of hybrid war, all 
Russian personnel acting in Ukraine have to be paid under the table, likely at an increased 
rate, as well as anyone who maintains contact with them.  For a limited, short-term 
engagement, hybrid warfare may have been more cost-effective, but as time has dragged 
on and more Russian soldiers have been killed in action, the cost of keeping involvement 
unknown has increased.  Moscow not only has to pay the military under the table, but 
possibly pro-Russian protesters and rioters.   
18 
 
By assessing the financial drawback of Russia’s strategy, it can be determined 
whether or not Russia has overspent on the conflict, which will help in determining 
whether or not hybrid warfare was successful in the conflict in Ukraine.  The three most 
prominent costs are those of the military, both overt and anonymous, the present and 
future price of Crimea, and the sanctions that were imposed afterwards.  
 Determining the financial cost of military assets that Russia has invested in 
Ukraine is no easy task, largely because of the disinformation spread by Russia and 
Moscow’s unwillingness to be forthcoming about both their actions in Ukraine and the 
full extent of their military.  Multiple sources of data could give some insight into how 
much Russia has spent on the military dimension of their hybrid conflict in Ukraine.  
Russia’s military budget is one such source, however, we cannot know whether the 
reported amounts are accurate or not, as multiple organizations, such as the International 
Institute of Security Studies and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) estimate that Russian defense spending is generally higher than the reported 
defense budget. The goal of looking at Russian military expenditures through the years is 
to see whether there is an uncharacteristic increase in military spending due to the 
Ukraine crisis.  This spike in expenditures could then be attributed to the conflict itself.  
 Information from Trading Economics (which uses data from World Bank) shows 
little variation in military spending.  As evidenced in Figure 4, the general trend here 
appears to be approximately a 5-6000 increase per year in USD million. This seems to be 
the consensus, as Figure 5 shows the same data presented by SIPRI. We would expect an 
increase in the years 2014 or 2015 to show an increase in military spending due to the 
19 
 
Ukrainian conflict.  From this information, we cannot conclude that Russian military 
spending has increased any more than it would have without the Ukrainian conflict.   
 
Source: SIPRI Milex Data 1998-2015, pg. 20 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf 
Figure 4 
 
 Viewed apart from Figure 4, Figures 5 and 6 seem to tell a similar story.  We see 
an increase in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP as GDP falls harshly in 2015.  
So, it would be easy to assume that military expenditures could stay the same and still see 
an increase in % of GDP.  However, when we take all the figures into account, the 
continued increase in military spending as GDP falls makes less sense, especially when 
compared to the years 2009 and 2010 where military expenditures fell as Russia 
recovered from the 2008 market crash.   
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Source: World Data Bank, Russia GDP per year in USD, 2009-2011, accessed 3/15/2017 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2015&locations=RU&start=2009 
Figure 5 
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Source: World Data Bank, Russia Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 2009-2011, accessed 3/15/2017 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=RU&start=2009 
Figure 6 
  
However, there is not enough evidence to confirm that the increase in military 
spending as Russian GDP falls is directly linked to Russia’s use of military forces in 
Ukraine.  This is because changes in overall military expenditures usually increase in 
preparation for a military conflict and during a standard military conflict.  Russia may 
have been preparing for a situation like what is happening in Ukraine, however, this is 
not a standard symmetric military conflict.  Instead, Russia is using limited military 
forces.  Furthermore, Moscow kept all Russian involvement in Ukraine secret until late 
2014, and even then few details were released. It then stands to reason that Russia could, 
and most likely would, hide any irregular military expenses.  So, in order to estimate 
Russia’s expenses in the Ukraine conflict, estimates must be made based on what 
armaments and training are reported as being supplied by Russia.  
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This information has already been looked into by multiple interested parties and 
economists, such as Boris Nemtsov and Andrey Illarionov.  According to Nemtsov’s 
“War. Putin”, the Russian government spent an estimated total of 53 billion rubles on 
various forms of military and upkeep for ten months of the conflict.  In addition to that is 
the 80 billion rubles spent on pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine.  In the report, 
Nemtsov stated that he knew of nearly 220 Russian soldiers who died in Ukrainian 
conflicts from late 2014 to early 2015.  He goes on to say that the families of the soldiers 
received 2 million rubles to not disclose the reasons for the deaths of the soldiers.  Added 
on to this is the inevitable costs of refugees.  In every war there are those who are 
misplaced, and this one was no different. Nemtsov estimated that Russia had payed near 
80 billion rubles by July 2014. 31  
 Costs could be even higher according to Russian economist, and Putin’s former 
economic policy advisor, Andrey Illarionov.  He puts the cost of the war at nearly 94 
billion US dollars, about 5 times as much as the cost estimated in “War. Putin,”.  He 
gives several reasons for the steep difference: 
“all military expenditures in the war against Ukraine are much higher than the direct costs 
of carrying out military actions directly on the territory of Ukraine.” 
“spending on the preparation and conduct of the war with Ukraine began long before the 
start of military operations against Ukraine.” 
“the current war begun by the Kremlin is a war not only with Ukraine.” 
                                                          
31 Anna Dolgov, “Nemtsov report Details human and financial costs of war in Ukraine”, The Moscow 
Times, 05/12/15 accessed 11/18/2016 https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/nemtsov-report-details-human-
and-financial-costs-of-war-in-ukraine-46471  
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“additional costs in connection with the preparation and conduct of military operations 
are born not only by the state budget but also by the private sector.”32 
And because of these reasons, he believes Nemtsov’s report to be incorrect. As an 
economist, he does not report on the human and property cost of the war, but he goes into 
much greater detail with his estimate.  Because Russian rearmament began in 2011, the 
increased GDP expenditure on the military must also be included.  So, the cost for 
Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine could be anywhere between 20 billion and 94 billion US 
dollars.  
 Russia also faces the cost of annexing Crimea from Ukraine.  Not only has Russia 
taken on the financial burden of adding another region, but Moscow made promises in 
2014 to Crimea, which will be costly to implement. These promises are not direct costs of 
hybrid warfare, but are consequences of its use and must be taken into consideration.  
Russia’s use of political maneuvering, “little green men” (the term used for unidentified 
soldiers in Crimea and the Donbass), and ethnic ties all effectively led to the annexation 
of Crimea.  If Russia continues to use hybrid warfare in a similar fashion, then 
infrastructure costs and promises made will continue to be expensive issues for Moscow.   
When Moscow annexed Crimea, it pledged to double state pensions for Crimea, 
adding up to an estimated 36 billion rubles annually.  Moscow also promised to raise 
wages of state workers to the Russian standard, which was estimated to cost 30 billion 
rubles a year.  The Russian government has also set aside an annual subsidy to Crimea.  
                                                          
32 Paul Goble, “Putin’s wars already costing Russia ~100 billion US dollars a year, Illarionov says”, 
Euromaidan Press, 10/11/15 accessed on 11/18/2016 http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/10/11/putins-wars-
already-costing-russia-100-billion-us-dollars-a-year-illarionov-says/  
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These expenditures combined for 2014 were approximately 55 billion rubles.  In addition 
to these payments, Russia stated its interest in reducing Crimean dependence on Ukraine.  
The first step in doing so is the construction of a road and railway bridge connecting 
Russia and Crimea.  The cost of this was estimated at 100 billion rubles in 2014.  
Reducing dependence on Ukrainian energy would also prove costly.  The Russian energy 
minister stated that it would cost up to 100 billion rubles build three power stations in 
Crimea.  Possible gas pipelines between Russia and Crimea could cost anywhere between 
200 million and a billion US dollars.  Prices that weren’t estimated for 2014 include 
Russian plans to upgrade schools, hospitals, agriculture and other important infrastructure 
within Crimea.  According to the Finance minister of Russia, Moscow spent 
approximately 243 billion rubles to support Crimea in 2014 alone. This sum includes 
both annual spending and one time expenditures, such as infrastructure expenses. The 
funds to pay for all of these has been coming from similar programs within Russia, 
meaning that not only is the Russian government facing financial deficits, but the Russian 
people are having their similar programs redistributed to Crimea.33 Russia reported a 
GRP of 155 billion rubles from Crimea in 2014, meaning that Crimea’s production only 
accounts for two thirds of its cost to Russia.  The reported GRP is only estimated data, 
and only accounts for March through December of 2014.  It is very unlikely that the 
unaccounted months are able to close the annual deficit, let alone make up for the 
structural costs.  Added to this amount is the inevitable bill for Ukrainian lawsuits.  
Covered under these lawsuits is the seizure of Ukrainian property and the breaking of 
                                                          
33  Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, and Olga Shorina, “Putin. War”, Free Russia Foundation,  
http://4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-Eng.pdf  
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recognized agreements.  The uncertainty that follows these proceedings has led to 
investors pulling away from Crimea, hurting Russia even more.34   
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and actions in Ukraine have also led to an 
expensive international backlash.  The EU and the United States have placed several 
rounds of sanctions on Russia, and Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia have 
followed their example.35  The sanctions placed by the United States and Europe were 
very similar, and began by targeting key individuals connected to Putin by freezing assets 
and placing travel bans. When this proved largely ineffective, sanctions were placed on 
the energy sector, keeping American and European energy companies from working with 
Russian companies.  Sanctions were also placed on Russian banks, shortening payment 
deadlines to 30 days and prohibiting financial help from European and American banks. 
Sanctions were then placed on the defense industry in Russia.  Some of Russia’s military 
and defense sector was not allowed access to financing, equipment, information, and 
other materials related to the industry36.  Finally, the EU and United States banned their 
companies from doing business in Crimea in an effort to put stress on the peninsula.  
                                                          
34  Jason Bush, “Factbox- Costs and assets from Russia’s annexation of Crimea”, Reuters, 04/08/14, 
accessed 10/17/16 http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-crimea-costs-factbox-
idUKBREA370NY20140408  
35 Wan Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis”, Journal of Politics and Law 
Vol. 8 No.2, pg. 1, 2015 accessed 3/4/2017 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1028.3835&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
36 Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions” 
Leigh Hansson, Michael Lowell, Sian Fellows, David Myers, Alexandra E. Allan, Alexandra Gordon, Hena 
M. Schommer, Laith Najjar, Overview of U.S. and EU Sanctions on Russia, ReedSmith, October 2014, 
accessed on 12/2/16 https://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/9221cf81-e4f7-4907-ab2c-
f7dc249eac58/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/441e0ec9-dbd8-4c3a-b1fa-0bf7ed4d5872/alert_14-
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According to Wan Wang, a scholar from Beijing Normal University, the sanctions 
were extremely effective in damaging the Russian economy, but had different effects on 
domestic sentiment, which will be discussed later on.  According to Wang, the falling 
price of oil combined with the sanctions led to shrinking federal reserves, $416 billion as 
of February 2015, as well as a large amount of capital outflow between 2014 and 201537, 
which is evidenced in Figure 7 from Trading Economics38. 
 
Figure 7 
 
According to Wang’s article, there are multiple ramifications of these sanctions.  
The Russian government is estimated to lose $4-5 billion per year sanctions are in effect, 
Russia’s credit rating has fallen to a lower level, GDP growth was negligible with 
sanctions in effect, and sanctions over a long-term period would limit modernization in 
Russia due to a lack of technology and investment inflow39.    
                                                          
37 Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions” 
38 Trading economics 
39 Wang, “Impact of Western Sanctions” 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S ACTIONS IN 
UKRAINE 
  
Public feeling towards the Russian government has been deeply affected by 
Russian actions in Ukraine. Those within Russia have been told that the government acts 
for the best interests of Russians across the globe and support Putin with a renewed vigor.  
Even as international sanctions damn Moscow’s actions, many Russians believe that the 
government has acted well within their rights and in the defense of all Russians.  Some of 
this reaction may come from Russia not declaring a formal war.  Societies, in general, 
tend to react negatively to any declaration of war.  Using hybrid warfare, the Kremlin 
was able to avoid this decline in public opinion, while still engaging in damaging 
operations. On the other hand, Russia has lost any popularity it had among Western 
nations with its hybrid war in Ukraine.  Because of the damage Moscow was able to 
cause through hybrid warfare without any formal military engagement, NATO members 
such as the Baltics are especially fearful. It is possible that NATO’s Article V will not 
constitute a military engagement under hybrid war, meaning that the Baltics could be at 
great risk should Russia decide to use it against them.  Because of the threat from Russia, 
NATO has taken steps to defend its members from any possible attack, causing further 
tensions on Russia’s western border.  This reaction differs from that of a normal military 
intervention or engagement, as NATO would have been justified in positioning far more 
soldiers and equipment along their eastern border.  Were NATO to do that now, Russia 
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would be able to spin it as proof of NATO aggression and further their disinformation 
campaign against the West. Since the West has reacted poorly to Russian actions, 
Moscow has turned to the East to find allies and partners, specifically China.   
By considering these political ramifications of Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine, I 
can determine whether Russia, as well as the Russian administration, has experienced a 
positive political or environment, or an environment that often condemns Moscow’s 
actions and has led to political problems for Russia.  It may prove that Putin’s 
administration has gained while the rest of Russia faces losses.   
Domestic Effects 
One would expect the recession that followed the events in Ukraine to have 
turned domestic sentiment against the Russian government as citizens faced increased 
prices and economic hardships.  However, it seems the opposite is true. The recession 
that followed Russia’s actions in Ukraine was met with increased support for the Putin 
administration40.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40  Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “Russian Public Opinion: Putin Praised, West 
Panned”, Pew Research Center, 2015, accessed 3/8/2017 http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/2-russian-
public-opinion-putin-praised-west-panned/  
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Figure 8 
 
               
Figure 9 
 
30 
 
Based on Figures 8 and 9, confidence in Putin has been on the rise since his 
election in 2012.  One would expect that confidence in Putin would be affected by severe 
economic changes, especially those with as many negative repercussions as the fall in oil 
prices and international sanctions. But the opposite appears to be true.  In fact, data from 
the Pew Research Center shows that a large majority of Russian citizens approve of his 
handling of the Russian economy specifically (Figure 10).  This data corresponds with 
Levada-Center polls, however, Levada-Center also shows that Russian approval of the 
government is only at 43%, with the disapproval rating at 55% as of March 2017.41  This 
further establishes that Putin has made gains politically while the image of the Russian 
government as a whole has been damaged. 
 Putin has also gained approval based on his handling of international relations. 
Figure 10 demonstrates that a sizeable majority of Russian citizens firmly support Putin’s 
actions regarding Western countries and organizations.  Based on this poll, Russians have 
no interest in seeking closer relations with the United States or members of the EU.  It 
may be that Russian citizens feel this way because blame for violence in Ukraine has 
been laid at the feet of the West.  Media in Russia has blamed the United States and 
NATO for encouraging Western expansionism, which has led to Russia having to 
reaffirm its influence in the area as a defensive measure42.  Russians also overwhelmingly 
support Putin’s handling of relations in Ukraine. Many within Russia believe Ukraine to 
be a part of Russia, which may explain some of the support for Russia’s actions in 
                                                          
41  Levada-Center, Indicators – Approval of the government, accessed 4/19/2017  
http://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/  
42 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 93, No. 5, pg. 77, 
accessed 3/10/2017 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora93&div=111&g_sent=1&collection=journals#  
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Ukraine.  Overall, these feelings could be influenced by what has been called a rise in 
Russian nationalism over the years.  In the past 5 years, favorable opinion of America, 
Germany, the EU, and NATO have all fallen by at least half.  At the time of polling, 
nationalism within Russia was very high, with 90% of those polled having a favorable 
opinion of their country43.  With the public supporting nationalist ideas such as this, it is 
little wonder why Moscow has seen to fit to use hybrid warfare to control the region.    
 
 
                                 
  
 
 
 
 
International Repercussions 
Russians’ view of their economy is the only public opinion that seems to have 
changed drastically due to incidents in Ukraine and following events.  Putin’s popularity 
has continued to climb, as opinion for the West declines.  International opinion of the 
                                                          
43 Simmons, “Russian Public Opinion” 
Figure 10 
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Russian government shows a more dynamic reaction to intervention in Crimea and the 
Donbass.  A poll of eight countries seen in Figure 11 (US, Canada, UK, Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, Poland) in 2014, shows that opinion of Putin and Russia plummeted after 
events in Ukraine.  Opinion of Russia overall had been on a general downward trend in 
many of these countries, but in each case there was a decrease in confidence in Russia 
between 2013 and 201444.  As the polls were conducted between April and May each 
year, public opinion would reflect how the international community reacted to Russia’s 
use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine in the early months of their involvement.  
                                                          
44 Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leery of 
Action on Ukraine”, Pew Research Center, 2015, accessed 3/10/2017 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
 
Many of these nations also see Moscow’s actions in Ukraine as a threat to their 
own safety.  The overwhelming majority of people polled see Russia as some kind of 
threat, and nearly half of all people polled see Russia as a major threat to its neighbors.  
Poland specifically has a large majority (Figure 12) that believe Russia is a major threat 
to its neighbors in the wake of events in Ukraine45.   
 Russia faced consequences in nearly every international organization it was a 
member of.   Russia was first removed from the G8, followed by a stop to cooperation 
from NATO and the EU. Russia also saw fewer visits from Western delegates and 
                                                          
45 Simmons, “NATO Public Opinion” 
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higher-ups46. The relationship between German and Russian leaders has deteriorated to 
that of businesslike, with none of the previous cooperation and agreement found in past 
years47. Cooperation between NATO and Moscow has disintegrated.  Instead, the idea of 
Russia being a threat and an enemy to NATO has returned.  Steps are being taken along 
NATO’s eastern border to defend against potential Russian aggression such as deploying 
troops along Russia’s border in the Baltics and in Poland48.   
 As the West shuns Russia, Moscow finds new connections in the East.  Russia has 
been noticeably increasing relations with Eastern countries for several years, but these 
efforts have become more noticeable since early 2014.  Many of the more developed 
economies, such as Japan or South Korea, in Asia are reliant on the United States, and so 
have followed the Western example of placing sanctions on Russia.  This makes  China 
the most receptive trading partner in the region.   
China has been amicable towards Russia in recent years because it has been 
through similar events49.  China has experienced its own revolutions, so understands 
Russia’s fear of Maidan revolutions and their ability to spread.  China is also against 
interfering in the domestic matters of other nations, so abstained from the UN Crimea 
vote. Actions like this have led to closer relations between China and Russia. Not all of 
Beijing’s actions are motivated by sympathy, however.  Russia finds itself without many 
partners, allowing China to get cheaper hydrocarbons.  Russia can also be a valuable ally 
                                                          
46 Dmitri Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry”, Carnegie Moscow 
Center, 2014, pg. 8,  accessed 3/10/2017 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf  
47 Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis”, pg. 19 
48 Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis”, pg. 9 
49 Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis”, pg. 21 
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in the ongoing territory disputes along China’s Pacific coastline.  Further, China may be 
able to gain advanced weapons technology from Russia in return for continued trade 
partnerships. Closer ties between Beijing and Moscow could also lead to the intertwining 
of the Silk Road Project and the Eurasian Economic Union, further bonding Russia to the 
East50.  Thus, Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine seems to have benefitted Beijing.  
Moscow’s actions have left few states willing to bargain with them, leaving most of the 
negotiating power in China’s hands.   
  Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine has been met with varying reactions 
from domestic and foreign populations.  Russians hail Putin as a hero because they 
believe he has stood up for their rights and culture, and is attempting to rebuild Russia 
into what it was before.  Some of these ideas, if not all, most likely came from Russian 
media as they fermented support for the government, much like how Russian media in 
Ukraine polarized the Russian population.  International opinion of Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine is generally united as well.  Western countries overwhelmingly condemn 
Moscow’s decision to use force and hybrid tactics in Ukraine and refuse to accept that 
Crimea has been annexed by Russia.  Russia has also gone from an occasionally 
unreliable trading partner, to a perceived threat and possible enemy to many European 
countries.  NATO members are especially worried, as Russia may be looking to damage 
the organization by proving it is unreliable and Article V is not to be trusted. There may 
be some truth in that belief based on public opinion of how NATO should respond in that 
situation 51.  China has now become a major partner of Moscow’s and the relationship 
                                                          
50 Trenin, “The Ukraine Crisis”, pg. 22 
51 Simmons, “NATO Public Opinion” 
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will most likely continue to grow as Russia finds itself further ostracized from the West.  
This could lead to military cooperation and has already amounted to trade deals and 
energy agreements lasting for decades.  Putin may have lost some popularity in the West, 
but there was little there to be had in the first place.  Instead, he has chosen to be feared in 
the West, revered in his own country, and an ally to the East.  This has placed him in a 
more advantageous position for the future.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Based on these findings, regarding the pre-existing conditions, the Russian 
economy, and political ramifications of hybrid warfare, it can be determined that Russia’s 
use of hybrid warfare was a relative success.  As I mentioned earlier, Russia’s goals for 
hybrid warfare in Ukraine have not been entirely disclosed, so some must be assumed.  
Moscow has said that their motivation for intervening in Ukraine comes from the need to 
protect ethnic Russians across the globe.  It is extremely plausible that Russia also chose 
to use force in Ukraine to push back NATO expansionism.  Moscow has often let their 
displeasure with NATO’s eastern growth be known, arguing tooth and nail against both 
the EU and NATO’s expansion eastward.  Leaders in Moscow have also shown a 
tendency to use military force as a political tool.  The people of Russia respond favorably 
to demonstrations of Russian strength.  Events in Ukraine could be much of the same.  
Finally, Russia may have hoped that conflict in the Donbass area would lead to the 
Russian border moving further west.   
 Russia’s annexation of Crimea made it impossible for Ukraine to join NATO or 
the EU.  Both organizations have strict rules of controlling all of one’s territory.  By 
causing friction in the Donbass region, Russia further removed Ukraine’s chances of 
becoming a European ally.  So, were it a goal of Russia’s to keep neighboring nations 
from joining Western organizations, Russia’s use of hybrid warfare would have been 
extremely successful.  Russia was able to fragment Ukraine without needing to admit 
39 
 
guilt until much later.  When Moscow did admit to its military involvement, the media 
was able to turn the events into a success for all of Russia.   
 Shows of force often come with an increase in leader popularity, and Russia is no 
different.  Even though the Russian people face economic downturn and international 
backlash, they still believe Putin to be a great leader.  Their support is likely tied to the 
spin Moscow has been able to put on events.  Because Russia is fighting for Russians 
everywhere, the Russian people feel better protected.  The annexation of Crimea is not 
illegal; it is only the restoration of the peninsula to its rightful homeland.  By using the 
media to twist events into a favorable light, Putin’s administration has indeed become 
more popular. 
Finally, Russia may have been attempting to pull some or all of Ukraine within its 
borders, striving for what has been called New Russia (or Novorossiya)52.  As of now, 
Russia has only succeeded in gaining Crimea, and even that is debatable, as many nations 
refuse to acknowledge the referendum.  Along the Ukrainian-Russian border, the Donetsk 
and Lugansk People’s Republics have declared themselves apart from Ukraine.  They 
have not joined Russia, however, and it is unlikely Ukraine will allow them independence 
at any point soon.  Here is the first goal that Russia did not achieve immediately.  In the 
coming years, it is not likely, but possible, that these People’s Republics will win their 
independence.  Should this happen, they will most likely quickly ally themselves with 
Russia, becoming dependent on Russia to keep them afloat.  So while Russia has not 
                                                          
52 ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, President of Russia website, 18 March 2014, accessed 
3/21/2017 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603  
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been able to gain as much territory as they may have hoped, it is still possible for them to 
do so in the future. 
As I stated in chapter 2, these successes did not come without substantial costs.  
However, Russia’s successes with hybrid warfare in Ukraine have outweighed whatever 
price tags may be associated with them.  Russia has kept Ukraine from becoming part of 
the West.  They have also proven that they are able to exert control over nations within 
their sphere of influence.  Putin has come out of the crisis with a higher popularity rating 
than ever before, and will most likely use this to his advantage in the upcoming Russian 
elections.  Russia has gained Crimea and promised the people to raise their standard of 
living.  While this proves to be a costly project, it will ingratiate the people of Crimea to 
Russia.  Based on this, Russia has been successful in its use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine.  
Because Russia has been successful, it stands to reason that Moscow may see fit to 
continue the practice of hybrid aggression in the future.  Countries that have similar 
vulnerabilities to Ukraine, such as the Baltics, may soon become targets.   
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